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Abstract 
Consciousness, the medium of sentient thought, requires integrity of functional 
networks and their connectivity. In health, they function as a co-operative but 
mutually exclusive paradigm of introspection versus external awareness subserved via 
the Default Mode Network and Task Positive State respectively. Higher thinking is 
segregated according to need, but this relationship is impacted in disorders of 
consciousness. In delirium, a disturbance of consciousness, the Default Mode 
Network is pathologically co-activated and functional cortical connectivity is 
compromised. Inversion of this functional network relationship in conjunction with 
cortical disconnectivity, we argue, is central to the mechanism of delirium. The 
corollary of divided networks is that internal and external drivers become 
indistinguishable, and an experiential singularity follows where reality and delusion 
merge and the notion of self is effaced. Clinical tools may exploit the neurobiology of 
delirium to improve diagnosis and an example of such a screening instrument is 
provided. After all, if delirium is just disorganized electricity then clinical instruments 
that reflect this neurobiology offer exciting research opportunities with potential for 
therapeutic gains in detection, diagnosis, and management.  
 
Introduction 
Delirium is a common consequence of an encounter between illness and frailty in the 
hospital setting. Delirium is considered to represent a change in attention associated 
with cognitive disturbance [1] or, more variably, a disturbance of consciousness [2]. 
The ICD-10 characterizes this impairment as a ‘clouding of consciousness (i.e., 
reduced clarity of awareness of the environment). Conversely, DSM V is less explicit 
regarding the role of consciousness disturbance but its contribution is alluded to in 
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terms of loss of awareness. This is at odds with earlier iterations of DSM criteria, 
which are clear in the involvement, if not the centrality, of consciousness and its 
dissolution in delirium. The fluctuating fortunes of consciousness in delirium 
diagnostic criteria are owed, no doubt, to impediments in its objective assessment [3]. 
Alternative features, such as reduced attention, are considered almost a surrogate for 
disturbance of consciousness and may account for its displacement from certain 
diagnostic criteria. Whether or not this approach is biologically sound is less clear. 
Other cardinal features are often used to inform the diagnosis, including disorientation 
to time, place or person, and disturbance of sleep-wake cycle. Psychomotor 
disturbance, emotional disruption, perceptual abnormalities and delusions may also 
accompany the condition, with fluctuation only making more elusive what is 
otherwise a great masquerader. Despite criticisms of diagnostic criteria, both the DSM 
and ICD, by the inclusion of cognitive impairment provide a classic means for 
distinguishing between other conditions that share psychiatric manifestations, such as 
psychosis. Emphasis on inattention also helps discriminate delirium from dementia, 
except when both diagnoses collide. The elephant in the room, or hallucination in the 
hospital bed, is the role that consciousness has to play. This impedes progress 
concerning our understanding and recognition of delirium and is unable to be 
reconciled by diagnostic criteria. If clinical criteria and neurobiology are unable to 
unravel the foundations of consciousness, as it pertains to delirium, then perhaps 
attempting to understand consciousness from first principles may shed light  on this 
enigma. For this, we must contemplate what consciousness represents at a 
fundamental level. Consciousness is described as the state in which all waking 
thoughts are marshalled. Indeed, there is no sentient thought, in the totality of 
description of symptoms that has not been impacted by delirium. For instance, 
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patients report their state of mind as being ‘on the threshold between awareness and 
unawareness’ [4] with all the disorganization of thought across all domains of 
contemplation a predictable response.  Thus, disturbance of consciousness is not just a 
convenient description applied to delirium but must be axiomatic to its diagnosis. Yet, 
disturbance of consciousness, as part of delirium, has not been operationalized at a 
clinical level, resulting in under-diagnosis of this potentially serious condition. 
Instead, physicians rely on symptoms of delirium to diagnose delirium but such 
approach poses diagnostic circularity. Without a reliable measurement of 
consciousness, conceptualization and identification of delirium remain superficial. To 
this extent, the premise that consciousness and its disturbance are central to delirium, 
presents opportunities for research enquiry.  For instance, thought in consciousness 
exists as a duality, not necessarily of a Cartesian dimension [5] where the thought is a 
non-physical entity that emanates from a physical substance, but in terms of a division 
according to functional properties. Consciousness embodies the mutually exclusive 
functions of introspection and readiness for action, binary states, which are subserved 
by two large-scale functional brain networks, the Default Mode Network (DMN) and 
Task Positive State (TPS), respectively. These functional networks allow segregation 
of sequential planning for action reflection and are thought to represent an 
evolutionary advantage, particularly in novel situations [6]. Conversely, disruptions of 
the functional networks are implicated in disorders of consciousness, such as 
delirium, with loss of reciprocity between states. This article presents an overview of 
the physiology of functional networks, their role in consciousness, and their 
disturbance in delirium. In particular, the clinical features of delirium, as they relate to 
the underlying neurobiology of conscious disturbance, together with opportunities in 
development of diagnostic instruments, will be explored.     
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Consciousness and Functional Networks 
As discussed, functional networks critical to consciousness encompass the DMN, 
which supports the function of self-reflection, or repose of the mind. DMN is paired 
with its functional antonym of action intention, TPS. Structurally, the DMN includes 
posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortices. Functionally, benefits of stimulus 
independent thought in DMN are numerous: positive constructive daydreaming, 
future planning, creativity, attentional cycling, and dishabituation [7], as well as 
offline memory consolidation [8], creative incubation and the generation of original 
ideas [9], future event simulation [10] and problem solving. TPS, on the other hand, 
comprises the dorsolateral, ventrolateral prefrontal and pre-supplementary motor 
areas, and is responsible for external awareness and, more tangibly, is of benefit to 
navigation in the physical world [11]. Reciprocal innervation of the DMN and task 
positive networks characterizes the physiological and sentient states. DMN and TPS 
function are anticorrelated, or mutually exclusive states, that would seem to follow the 
Heisenberg principle. In other words, the more we know about one state at any point 
in time, the less we know of the other. So, at an experiential level, one can be in an 
attitude of reflection or action intention but not in both simultaneously [12]. Cognitive 
processing requires that these functional networks connect properly between brain 
regions (i.e., functional connectivity) and interact dynamically to optimize cognitive 
capacity. Functional network relationships and connectivity integrity, measured using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), are integral to cognition and 
awareness of self in relation to the environment; in other words, are pivotal to 
consciousness [13, 14, 15]. This can be appreciated schematically with a 
representation of the ‘universe of consciousness’ (see figure 1)  [12].  How DMN/TPS 
uncoupling relates to other features of delirium has not been explored yet. Salient 
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features, such as loss of tenacity, or sustained attention and hypervigilance are notable 
considerations. The task positive state activates during attention, demanding tasks to 
provide ‘external awareness’. These functions are characteristically compromized, in 
terms of the clinically measureable ability to focus, shift, and sustain attention in 
delirium. It is conjectured that TPS activity is also impaired, but has not been studied.  
Unfortunately, imaging in delirium is a challenge owing to behavioural 
disturbance and movement artefacts that reduce both the feasibility and accuracy of 
MRI. Additionally, concomitant CNS disease, and in particular co-existent white 
matter disease, observed in Korsakoff’s syndrome, may confound interpretation [16]. 
Undertaking long and exacting studies in patients who are most frequently frail and 
suffering from disorganized thinking also presents ethical barriers. Hence, there are 
only a handful of neuroimaging studies in delirium and only one that has explored the 
role of functional networks, with the action of TPS implied [17]. Nevertheless, the 
findings from this study, together with supporting literature from other fields, shall 
form the basis of this review in which we highlight the critical role of functional 
networks in delirium and their relation to the clinical features of this confusional state.   
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Fig. 1. The Universe of consciousness shows the relationships between the components of 
consciousness: (i) the level of consciousness is modulated by alertness; (ii) the content of 
consciousness is filtered by arousal and consists of awareness of self and the environment; 
(iii) consciousness, focused by attention, can switch between task positive cognition and 
reflection. 
 
Default mode networks in pathology and delirium 
Default mode networks are highly coherent and functionally distinct brain circuits  
[18] that interact dynamically with each other in order to mediate sensorimotor and 
cognitive functions, such as consciousness, memory, or attention [19,20].  Disruptions 
of resting state networks have been linked to cognitive decline [21], depression [22] 
and schizophrenia [23]. Failure of striatal inhibition of DMN has been implicated in 
pathologically intense self-reference symptoms observed in schizophrenia [24, 25] 
and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia [26]. Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
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shares some of the cognitive, behavioral and psychiatric manifestations of delirium, 
not to mention reciprocal risk. DMN hypometabolism [27] and reduced DMN 
connectivity [28] that affect even unaffected carriers of familial AD [29] are 
characteristics of AD that make it a candidate biomarker [30]. DMN disconnectivity 
tends to reverse on AD treatment with cholinesterase inhibitors [31]. Paradoxically, 
connectivity overload within the DMN results in compensatory load shifting, which 
may instigate downstream neuronal dysregulation [32].  
 Specifically, the DMN is known to functionally subserve internally-driven 
cognitive operations (e.g., self-referential, language, and memory processes [33, 34]). 
Importantly, however, this network also plays a critical role in cognitive processes 
that are engaged during stimulus-directed tasks, as it dynamically interacts with task-
related networks. To date, only a single study has examined resting state functional 
connectivity in patients with delirium [17]. Fourteen patients underwent functional 
MRI, both during and after an episode of delirium, compared with a control group. 
Functional connectivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was found to be inversely 
proportional to task positive activity of the posterior cingulate cortex in healthy 
controls. In delirium, however, a positive correlation between DMN and TPS regions 
was observed simultaneously. Choi et al. propose that loss of independence between 
the DMN and TPS suggests an underlying mechanism for reduced clarity of 
awareness, or clouding of consciousness [17]. This finding resonates with the clinical 
picture of a patient with delirium: inattentive, unable to complete simple tasks, 
disorganized in thought and lacking agency [35]. These clinical features of delirium 
would appear to be task independent (clinical abnormalities are present whether at rest 
or during task). Therefore, if functional networks are implicated then it can be 
conjectured that reciprocity is also lost during task activity although this has yet to be 
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demonstrated. The authors also noted that a healthy anticorrelation between functional 
networks did not resume, even after apparent clinical recovery according to 
improvement in delirium rating scores. This is an important finding and reflects 
similar loss of connectivity after recovery from propofol- induced coma [36]. Whether 
the recovery time of functional relationships provides prognostic clues would be an 
interesting research line of enquiry as apparent clinical recovery still often confers a 
poor prognosis and risk of dementia [37, 38].   
 In addition to these qualitative changes, a quantitative reduction in functional 
connectivity between subcortical regions was also reversibly reduced during delirium 
[17]. This finding has also been observed in EEG-derived functional connectivity, 
with desynchronization with respect to  alpha band following post cardiac surgery 
delirium [39], which is speculated to contribute to attentional deficits [40,41]. 
Decrease in alpha power has also been described in the vegetative state [42]. As well 
as attention, disconnectivity may also be impacting consciousness level, which may 
be important in delirium when arousal or alertness diminish, such as hypoactive 
states.  The disconnection syndrome has also been observed in subcortical vascular 
cognitive impairment [43,44] and psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder [45]. Indeed, there is a suggestion that hallucinations, as part of 
delirium and schizophrenia, may share disturbed small world networks. Hub region 
targeted attacks of brain network also contribute to global disconnectivity and 
widespread cognitive impairment identified in Alzheimer’s’ disease, all the while in a 
conscious state. Altered consciousness in delirium, through disrupted functional 
network relationships, would, in the context of a disconnection disorder, provoke a 
ground zero for cognition. This may account for why the confusion is ‘an 
incomprehensible experience’ to the sufferer [46]. Furthermore, and in keeping with 
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delirium being a form of madness [46], it can be argued that the cognitive void 
created by consciousness clouding and disconnectivity syndrome is intruded by 
psychiatric symptoms, as is commonly observed [47]. Often, patients feel the 
simultaneous juxtaposition of past, present and imagination merge into an unpleasant 
experiential singularity [47].  It is arguable that more networks are affected in 
delirium and yet it seems reasonable to hypothesize that a breakdown in networks 
involved in attention, self-reference and whole brain integration would, in and of 
themselves, be sufficient to account for the protean manifestations of delirium. 
Alternatively, as was observed by Hughlings Jackson, when higher-order thinking 
breaks down, primitive central nervous system drive takes over [48].    
One may argue that functional disturbance in delirium might be non-causal 
and merely an epiphenomenon. However, reduced anticorrelation between the DMN 
and task-positive networks has been observed in other disorders of consciousness, 
such as in propofol- induced loss of consciousness and vegetative state [13, 14] in 
addition to disconnectivity [39]. Overall, the relationship between paired networks of 
DMN and TPS, and subcortical functional disconnection are likely to play a role in 
the neurobiology of delirium.  
Implications for clinical practice 
To date, there have been at least 24 delirium scales and 11 screening tools developed 
for diagnostic purposes [49], all relying on the clinical symptoms of delirium for 
diagnosis. Perhaps the prolific output of scales and dependence upon ancillary 
features of delirium are effect and cause of this diagnostic circularity. However, the 
presentation of delirium can be varied with a spectrum of psychomotor subtypes that 
has the ability to confound even experienced practitioners. The Confusion 
Assessment Method, which was developed by an expert panel and derived from 
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DSM-III-R criteria [50], is perhaps the most widely used in a research or clinical 
context [51]. This instrument relies upon training of the rater for optimum results. 
Also, psychomotor properties have shown both reduced sensitivity when used by 
nurses. Lower specificity has also been demonstrated when the instrument has been 
used in the presence of psychiatric comorbidity [52]. The Delirium Rating scale (and 
DRS-R-98) performs well and is perhaps the reference standard when it comes to 
estimating severity [53, 54]. Use of this instrument is, however, limited to psychiatric 
populations, and for those with psychiatric training. The 4AT is straightforward, brief 
to administer, and exploits simple questions that relate to most of the core features of 
delirium, such as counting months of the year backwards for attention [55, 56] 
generating a score consistent with the presence or absence of delirium. What these, 
and all other delirium screening/ diagnostic tools, rely on are the findings of cognitive 
impairment, particularly inattention. Whilst cognitive dysfunction is recognized as a 
core feature of delirium, there is no consensus on how this should be determined. 
Psychiatric symptoms (e.g., delusions and hallucinations) are well described in 
delirium as is psychomotor disturbance, and these symptoms are often included in 
delirium screening. However, inclusion of these items favours recognition of more 
florid forms of delirium, so-called hyperactive delirium, which is not usually a 
diagnostic problem at a clinical level. Most inconsistently conceptualized and applied 
to delirium screening is the disruption of an imprecise construct of consciousness 
content that inhabits a mercurial continuum between alertness and coma [57]. 
Therefore, diagnosis of delirium would be most desirable if it captured not just the 
symptoms, but also clinical features that most closely reflected the underlying 
neurobiology. An understanding of functional networks in health and disease forms a 
foundation of any approach to exploring the fundamental clinical features of delirium. 
 12 
In health, consciousness is characterized by network integrity and intact connectivity. 
Observable and testable tenets of an intact state of consciousness would thus 
comprise: (1) dynamic networks that interact freely; (2) preserved reciprocal 
innervation between networks; and (3) integrity of cortical connectivity. Clinically, 
this would be demonstrated by reflective thought in the medium of awareness (DMN) 
that is followed by congruent action (TPS). Conversely, in delirium, any clinical tool 
that mirrors: (1) disturbance in the ability to alternate between DMN and TPS; (2) 
loss of reciprocal innervation; and (3) disconnectivity syndrome would reflect biology 
of delirium in the medium of consciousness disturbance. There may be ways of 
specifically testing DMN, such as application of the self- referential and theory of 
mind [58], the ability to intuit mental states to oneself and others, and mnemonic 
facilitation hypothesis [59, 60]. However, these may be beyond the reach of the 
delirious patient, owing to limited attention span and inadequate cognitive reserves 
required for such tasks. The point of departure from a sustained task as de facto mind 
wandering might be a more straightforward way of assuming engagement of the 
DMN [61]. Therefore, any candidate instruments for use in the context of delirium 
would need to be relatively simple (as otherwise the high prevalence of prior 
dementia in delirium would result in false positives) and short (to avoid non-
completion in the context of inattention).  
From this premise, our multiprofessional group (neuropsychologist, 
geriatrician, physician and registered nurse) developed from first principles and 
through an iterative process the Simple Query for easy evaluation of consciousness 
(SQeeC) [62]. The first question, ‘Name a place you would like to visit that you have 
never been before’ examines the reflective state subserved through the DMN. The 
second question ‘How would you get there’ was reasoned to exploit task positive 
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cognition. This query was refined by an expert group and tested in a hospitalized 
acute medical/geriatric population of 100 patients against consultant geriatrician 
clinical opinion and standard screening. The SQeeC showed a sensitivity of 83% and 
specificity of 81%, respectively. Whilst these are encouraging results, what is more 
salient from a proof of principle perspective is that virtually no patients who were able 
to answer the SqeeC correctly were delirious (negative predictive value of 97%). This 
result suggests to our group that intact functional networks as part of the construct of 
consciousness and reflected in simple directed questions, if proven to be intact, must 
reflect a non-delirious state. From cogito ergo sum to tibi conscientia demonstrat ergo 
non deliriaire (you demonstrate thought and so are not delirious). Our group argue 
that this hitherto most elusive part of delirium screening, around consciousness, is 
measureable and may yet prove to be the most insightful. Further development and 
testing of instruments that are intended to reflect the neurobiology of delirium and 
their neurophysiological correlates are required.  To date, delirium has been described 
and diagnosed primarily in terms of observable symptoms and their measurement. 
This, as we have discussed, has resulted in a form of diagnostic circularity. If delirium 
can be conceptualised as a disorder of consciousness, functional networks, which are 
important in the maintenance of awareness, must be compromized in the delirious 
patient. To this end, further development of clinical tools, which converge on the 
true essence of delirium in terms of functional networks, are required. 
 
Further studies 
Greater understanding of the neurobiology of delirium may inform the 
development of improved diagnostic tools and more efficacious treatments to follow. 
Functional analysis of patients with delirium remains in its infancy, with practical, 
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methodological, and ethical challenges remaining [63]. Careful selection of patients, 
streamlined protocols, and psychotropic agents that are neutral to functional 
properties may optimize the research outputs within an ethical paradigm. The 
interrelationship between functional and structural CNS architecture is paramount; 
most commonly delirium is caused by a problem outside of the brain and yet global or 
focal brain lesions are important in causality. The ability for functional studies to test 
existing theories in relation to pathogenesis, aberrant stress response, neurotransmitter 
hypothesis, microglial activation, and/or inflammatory cascade will be key to unlock 
the prospect of evaluating targeted therapies [64]. How neurophysiology relates to 
risk of delirium would be valuable to quantify and the attenuation of neurobiology in 
response to preventative and treatment strategies may define more precise 
management plans. Any and all of such studies need to be planned in the context of 
vulnerability factors, such as dementia, which have a direct effect on neurophysiology 
and with an appreciation of the heterogeneous nature of causation.   
 
Conclusion 
Consciousness, the medium of sentient thought, requires integrity of functional 
networks and their connectivity. In health, these networks function as a co-operative, 
but mutually exclusive, paradigm that helps segregate higher thinking according to 
need. When consciousness is disturbed, such as in delirium, the DMN is 
pathologically co-activated and functional cortical connectivity is compromised. 
Internal and external drivers become indistinguishable, and an experiential singularity 
follows where reality and delusion merge, and the notion of self is effaced. There is 
conceptual and neurophysiological evidence to support functional network disruption 
and cortical disconnectivity as central to the mechanism of delirium. Clinical tools 
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may exploit the neurobiology of delirium and an example of such a screening 
instrument is provided. Clinical instruments that reflect the cardinal neurobiology of 
delirium offers exciting research opportunities with potential for gains in detection, 
diagnosis, and therapeutics.        
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